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Responsibility to Protect  
after the Arab Spring
Aidan Hehir and James Pattison
Introduction
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has become the pre-eminent framework for discuss-
ing humanitarian intervention and issues related to human rights protection generally. Its 
origins lie in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), which first proposed the notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Its 
adoption at the 2005 United Nations (UN) World Summit, with over 160 heads of state in 
attendance, has led to numerous inter-disciplinary debates within academia and beyond. 
The R2P has often been controversial, but the eruption of the ‘Arab Spring’ in late 2010 
has constituted the concept’s most exacting test and prompted a further spike in interest in 
both its efficacy and desirability. The articles in this special issue assess the R2P in light 
of the events during, and debates surrounding, the Arab Spring. Together, they constitute 
a uniquely focused assessment of this significant and influential doctrine.
This introduction will first consider in more detail the importance of the R2P for the 
Arab Spring, before going on to consider, conversely, the importance of the Arab Spring 
for the R2P. It will then outline the focus of the special issue and the two central ques-
tions with which it is concerned. Finally, it will provide an overview of the debate in the 
articles and how they address the two central questions.
The importance of the Responsibility to Protect for the 
Arab Spring and vice versa
The Arab Spring comprised a dramatic series of protests and revolutions against authori-
tarian and repressive regimes. It is widely viewed as starting in Tunisia in December 
2010 when the street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in protest at police 
harassment. This led to protests and a popular uprising that in turn led to the overthrow 
of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s government. The protest movements spread to other states, 
including Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria, Jordon and, notably, Egypt, where Hosni Mubarak’s 
regime eventually succumbed to weeks of pressure from large-scale protests in Cairo and 
elsewhere. In Libya, anti-Gaddafi protestors soon controlled Benghazi, the 
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second-largest city in the country, and the government launched a crackdown in response. 
In Syria, thousands of protesters called for the resignation of President Basher al-Assad 
in various cities across the country, leading to a violent response by the Assad regime 
and, later in 2011, the armed uprising of the Free Syrian Army.
The international reaction to the Arab Spring was initially one of significant optimism 
and some degree of support, albeit nervous. There was a sense that it could lead to long-
lasting, democratic rule in the Middle East and that this was an important moment for the 
region. In Libya, the crackdown by the Gaddafi regime on the protesters led to robust 
action by the international community. Resolution 1970 referred the situation to the 
International Criminal Court and imposed an arms embargo, as well as a travel ban and 
asset freeze on many members of the Gaddafi regime. In Resolution 1973, passed in 
March 2011, the UN Security Council authorised the imposition of a no-fly zone and the 
use of all necessary means to protect the Libyan population under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. This intervention was widely framed in the academic, public and political debate 
in the context of the R2P.1 That said, it is moot how important the R2P was for motivating 
the intervention in Libya (see, for instance, the articles by Hehir, Morris and Glanville in 
this special issue). In Syria, the R2P has similarly informed the debates about how the 
international community should react to the subsequent civil war between the Assad 
regime, the Free Syrian Army and, increasingly, Islamic extremists. Yet the USA and 
other states backed away from undertaking humanitarian intervention in 2013 in response 
to chemical weapons attacks by the Assad regime and, ultimately, little has been done to 
stop the bloodshed in Syria. For some, this shows the R2P fails to have any impact, but 
others (such as Glanville in his contribution) contest this.
Unfortunately, much of the optimism surrounding the Arab Spring has since dissi-
pated, as many of the states where there were revolutions are currently enduring severe 
instability. Libya is currently experiencing civil war, with fighting between Islamist 
rebels and government forces, particularly around Benghazi. Egypt is again subject to 
authoritarian rule, but this time this rule is defended by some of the advocates of the 
overthrow of Mubarak, fearful that the alternative – such as the Muslim Brotherhood – 
have been or could be even worse. As already noted, Syria has been subject to a bloody 
civil war, with the death toll estimated at over 220,000 (Jones and Shaheen, 2015).
This so-called subsequent ‘Arab Winter’ (Kurzman et al., 2013) has meant that the 
potential for stable democratic rule has given way to a fear of the entrenchment of 
authoritarian governments states and, potentially worse, bloody civil, intrastate sectarian 
wars where mass atrocities abound. The Arab Spring has therefore given rise to several 
R2P cases under ‘pillar one’ of the doctrine as outlined in the 2009 report by the UN 
Secretary General (UNSG) – ‘the protection responsibilities of states’ – where states are 
required to ensure that their own populations are not subject to war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (Ban, 2009). Many have failed in this respon-
sibility. This has meant that the international community has a remedial, inter-national 
responsibility to respond, under R2P’s ‘pillar two’ if possible – international assistance 
and capacity-building – but most clearly under ‘pillar three’ – ‘timely and decisive 
response’ (Ban, 2009). The international community’s success in meeting this responsi-
bility has been disputed, but clearly subject to some obvious failures, most notably in 
Syria. The so-called Arab Winter seems likely to give rise to several future cases where 
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the international community will be called on to respond. Given that much of the domestic 
and international reaction will be likely to be framed by the R2P, the reactions under the 
R2P umbrella (whether really motivated by the R2P or not) are likely to be important for 
future events in the Middle East. To that extent, the R2P is of vital importance to the Arab 
Spring and Winter.
Conversely, the Arab Spring is hugely important for the R2P. The historian Martin 
Gilbert has referred to the R2P as the ‘most significant adjustment to national sovereignty 
in 360 years’ (in Axworthy and Rock, 2009: 69). In a similar vein, Ramesh Thakur and 
Thomas Weiss (2009) claim that the R2P is the ‘most dramatic development of our time—
comparable to the Nuremberg trials and the 1948 Convention on Genocide’ (p. 23). Both 
statements were made prior to 2011 and the Arab Spring. If anything, the Arab Spring 
appears to have made the R2P even more important, if not for practice (the contributors in 
this special issue disagree about its political import), certainly for its relevance for debates 
not simply about humanitarian intervention, but also prevention of mass atrocities more 
generally. As noted above, debates in academia as well as public debates now commonly 
frame discussions not only about the potential case for military intervention in terms of 
the R2P, but also for atrocity prevention strategies and the import of states protecting their 
own populations. The Arab Spring seems to have exacerbated this tendency.
Yet, the R2P is still a fairly young doctrine, having only been accepted by states in 
2005 and formulated in the three pillar approach in the report of the UNSG in 2009 
(Ban, 2009). As such, it lacks many cases to test its efficacy and desirability. The uprisings 
in the Arab world since 2011 provide numerous important cases for the R2P doctrine; 
how the R2P is perceived as reacting to them will be crucial for the future of the doctrine. 
If it is seen, for instance, as being effective, then it may help to garner political support 
surrounding the doctrine. Alternatively, if it is seen as ineffective or morally problematic, 
the R2P may fade, like the related notion of ‘human security’ arguably has done. The 
Arab Spring is therefore vital for the R2P.
It is therefore the opportune time to reconsider R2P doctrine in light of the Arab 
Spring. Accordingly, this special issue is driven by two central, related questions: (i) In 
light of the Arab Spring, how efficacious is the R2P at addressing mass atrocities? (ii) Is 
the R2P a desirable way of addressing mass atrocities, given the Arab Spring? The six 
contributions address these questions. In doing so, their focus is not on the Arab Spring 
per se, but rather the R2P after this hugely significant event.
The road ahead
The first two articles consider the UN Security Council resolutions on the Arab Spring. 
Jess Gifkins focuses, in particular, on the claim that the R2P has been weakened by the 
international response to the Libyan intervention. It was widely claimed, for instance, that 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries – in particular, Russia 
and China – were frustrated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led 
bombing campaign in Libya and, especially, the alleged misuse of Resolution 1973 to 
facilitate regime change in Libya. Others (e.g. Bellamy, 2014) have claimed that the R2P 
has been used many more times since Libya and that the claims of post-Libya ‘blowback’ 
on the R2P are overstated. Gifkins takes this argument further, arguing that the R2P was in 
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fact much more contentious within the Security Council prior to the Arab Spring. For her, 
although there remains contention around the international remedial responsibility to 
protect, the protection responsibilities of states are more frequently highlighted since the Arab 
Spring. To that extent, despite some contestation, the Security Council is becoming increas-
ingly persuaded of the R2P’s merits. This, she argues, was clear during the Arab Spring, 
during which the Security Council showed an augmented willingness to apply the R2P.
Aidan Hehir takes a more sceptical line (although one that is potentially consistent 
with Gifkins’ analysis). For Hehir, the R2P lacks any influence and this is shown by the 
Arab Spring, which has demonstrated that the R2P remains, at best, a contested concept 
with limited impact on the behaviour of states. This is clear, he claims, in the responses 
to Libya, Bahrain and Syria. Such cases are driven, he argues, by narrowly conceived 
self-interest of states rather than the R2P norm. Hehir accepts, with others (e.g. Gifkins), 
that the pillar one protection responsibilities of states are oft cited, but, for him, what 
is potentially value-added about the R2P is the international remedial responsibility to 
protect. It is this aspect, he claims, that is crucially absent from UN Security Council 
resolutions related to the Arab Spring.
Luke Glanville contests much of what Hehir argues; Glanville states that ‘the R2P 
norm in fact has a very real and readily observable impact on the behaviour of states’. 
Drawing on recent constructivist scholarship, Glanville helpfully distinguishes between 
the potential ‘regulative’ and ‘constitutive’ effects of norms. The former – regulative 
effects – constrain or encourage states to behave in certain ways, whereas the latter – the 
constitutive effects – constitute identities and interests. Glanville, contra Hehir, argues 
that these effects can be found in regard to the international remedial R2P, and not simply 
the domestic protection responsibilities of states. Yet, he argues that the R2P norm should 
not be seen as requiring the responsibility to always engage in direct action to address 
ongoing mass atrocities (given that there may be no appropriate course of action that will 
be better than doing nothing), but rather that there is an obligation to ‘try’. More posi-
tively, for Glanville, the intervention in Libya cannot be explained without reference to 
the power of the R2P. In his words, ‘the impact of R2P and related ideas of human protec-
tion in this case is clear’. He accepts that the international community has failed to live 
up to its R2P in the case of Syria, but argues strongly that this does not mean that the R2P 
lacks impact since, for instance, states have at least felt the need to justify their inade-
quate response.
A less optimistic reading is presented by Justin Morris. For him, there is a notable 
concern about the inclusion of humanitarian intervention within the R2P doctrine. He 
worries that R2P has become toxic since the Arab Spring due to the intervention in Libya. 
He argues, contra Gifkins and Glanville, that the lack of action in Syria is due to post-
Libyan blowback. According to Morris, this has led to resurgent concerns about the R2P 
and, in particular, the use of force. The solution, he suggests, is clear: ‘the excision of its 
non-consensual, coercive military aspects’. This would mark ‘yet another step in interna-
tional society’s journey towards ensuring that state sovereignty does not act as a veil behind 
which the grossest of mass human rights violations can be committed with impunity’. For 
Hehir and Glanville, this may remove much of what is value-added about the R2P, namely, 
the international remedial responsibility to react, and particularly the duty to engage in 
international coercive military action. Nevertheless, it does have some affinity with the 
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strategy taken by the first special UN Special Adviser on the R2P, Ed Luck, who, prior to 
the Arab Spring, frequently downplayed – and sometimes overlooked – the potential for 
the R2P to involve humanitarian intervention, for fear of watering down the emerging 
international consensus on the R2P. This strategy, also somewhat adopted by Ban 
Ki-moon, has been derided by Thomas Weiss (2011) for seeking to avoid controversy, 
given that ‘[m]ilitary humanitarianism is a necessary, albeit insufficient, component of the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (p. 290). To be clear, Morris does not want to reject the case for 
humanitarian intervention; he thinks that the UN Security Council may still authorise 
military intervention, but this should be outside of the R2P framework.
In her contribution, the current UN Special Adviser on the R2P, Jennifer Welsh, also 
considers ways that the R2P can be taken forward in light of the Arab Spring. However, 
in contrast to Morris, she focuses on the issue of prevention, which is widely referred to 
as the most important aspect of the R2P. Drawing on a number of empirical insights on 
effective preventative action, she considers why prevention remains tricky and assesses 
efforts to implement the commitment to prevention. Welsh goes on to offer an explana-
tion for why prevention is in fact a controversial practice – despite the universal rhetori-
cal commitment to its prioritisation – and identifies a series of steps that might be 
undertaken to advance it.
As is clear from the contributions by Hehir and Glanville, some of the debate about 
the efficacy of the R2P depends in part on underlying debates in constructivism and 
Realism about the comparative import of ideational and material concerns. This debate 
should not simply be seen as applying the merits of Realism and constructivism, how-
ever. To a certain degree, the plausibility of either approach will be also in large part 
determined by the R2P. After all, the related notion of humanitarian intervention has 
been a central example used by constructivists in the development of their doctrine. For 
instance, Nicolas Wheeler’s (2000) Saving Strangers and Martha Finnemore’s (2004) 
work on humanitarian intervention are important not simply as accounts of the reasons 
why states engage in humanitarian intervention, but are also important contributions to 
constructivism per se – and in particular to the defence of the view that states may be 
concerned with more than simply narrow material interests. Humanitarian intervention 
– and potentially the R2P – seems to provide a potentially clear case of where states are 
influenced somewhat by ideational concerns.
Notwithstanding the disagreement between them, Gifkins, Hehir, Glanville, Morris 
and Welsh all largely accept the normative worth of the underlying ideal of the R2P. They 
disagree about its practical merits and how best to realise the tackling of mass atrocities. 
For Hehir, and to a lesser extent Morris, the R2P lacks efficacy and so should be amended 
or even abandoned in favour of a less openly coercive approach (Morris) or a more legal-
istic and coercive one (Hehir). The underlying normative worth is, however, questioned 
by the last contribution.
Phillip Cunliffe claims that the Arab Spring means that we should reflect back on 
founding premises of the R2P, which are contained in the original ICISS report. He 
argues that the doctrine is normatively problematic, since it dilates the responsibilities 
that are owed by states to their own population. For him, the R2P is at odds with the need 
for representation within states. States, he claims, need to be free to decide their own 
destinies. There is, of course, the worry that undemocratic states will subject their 
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populations to war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In addition, 
even democratic states may potentially subject minorities to mass atrocities or, perhaps 
more likely, severe repression. After all, the ‘tyranny of the majority’ is a commonly 
discussed issue in political theory and one of the central justifications for having checks 
on majority rule, such as in the form of human rights and, potentially, the R2P. However, 
this is not the only concern that Cunliffe has about the R2P. A further worry he raises is 
that the R2P is overly statist and imprisons populations within conflicts, being ‘complicit 
in and productive of a highly restrictive global migration regime’. Regardless of whether 
one agrees with this claim, it does seem that the R2P has not been sufficiently intertwined 
with the R2P around refugee protection and, more broadly, international refugee law. 
In addition, it is clear that states have not been living up to their responsibilities in 
this regard. In the case of Syria, for instance, it was reported in June 2015 that the UK 
government had accepted only 140 refugees (Watt, 2015), which seems at odds with the 
underlying notion that it has a responsibility to protect citizens from beyond its borders 
from mass atrocities.
The articles here, therefore, do not cohere with a particular perspective on the R2P but 
rather constitute different elements of the debate on this most keenly contested of issues. 
The R2P, whatever one thinks of its merits, is likely to continue to inform debate on the 
international response to intra-state mass atrocities for many years and, thus, we hope 
these reflections on the strengths, weaknesses and efficacy to date of the concept will 
inform future analysis and debate.
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Note
1. For instance, Ed Miliband (2011), the Leader of the Labour Party in the UK, invoked the R2P 
in the House of Commons debate on Resolution 1973, claiming that doing nothing ‘would 
be a dereliction of our duty’ (he also cites the ICISS precautionary principles). Also see the 
roundtable on the Libya intervention in Ethics & International Affairs, 25(3) (2011).
References
Axworthy L and Rock A (2009) R2P: a new and unfinished agenda. Global Responsibility to 
Protect 1(1): 54–69.
Bellamy A (2014) From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson learning and the implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect. International Politics 51(1): 23–44.
Finnemore M (2004) The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) The Responsibility to 
Protect. Ottawa, ON, Canada: International Development Research Centre.
Jones S and Shaheen K (2015) Syrian refugees: four million people forced to flee as crisis deepens. 
The Guardian, 9 July. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/
jul/09/syria-refugees-4-million-people-flee-crisis-deepens (accessed 10 July 2015).
 at University of Westminster on April 5, 2016cac.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Hehir and Pattison 7
Ban K (2009) Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: report of the Secretary-General. 
A/63/677. New York: United Nations.
Kurzman C, Fahmy DF, Gengler J, et al. (2013) Arab Winter. Contexts 12(2): 12–21.
Miliband E (2011) Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 21 March 2011, Column 716.
Thakur R and Weiss TG (2009) R2P: from idea to norm – and action? Global Responsibility to 
Protect 1(1): 22–53.
Watt N (2015) UK Government turning its back on Syrian refugees, says Yvette Cooper. The 
Guardian, 7 June. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/07/yvette-
cooper-uk-government-syrian-refugees (accessed 10 July 2015).
Weiss T (2011) RtoP alive and well after Libya. Ethics & International Affairs 25(3): 287–292.
Wheeler N (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Author biographies
Aidan Hehir is Reader of International Relations at the University of Westminster. He has pub-
lished widely on R2P and humanitarian intervention, including The Responsibility to Protect: 
Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave, 2012) and Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Introduction (Palgrave, 2013). He also edits a series for Routledge on Intervention 
and Statebuilding.
James Pattison is Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester. He is the author of 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (OUP, 2010) 
and The Morality of Private War: The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies 
(OUP, 2014). His research interests concern ethical issues raised by international politics and he is 
currently working a third monograph that examines the ethics of the alternatives to military force.
 at University of Westminster on April 5, 2016cac.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
